














The Strategic Effects of Firm Sizes and Dynamic Capabilities on Overseas Operations 








In international business, much attention has been directed to the international expansion of 
firms based on their use of resources and competitive capabilities that have been built up in a 
home country to create a competitive advantage over host-country firms. More recently, the 
organizational capabilities and competitive advantages of Japanese manufacturing firms in 
general (in autos, electronics, etc.) have been analyzed as important factors in the establishment 
of overseas transplants. The theoretical framework of the overseas application of home-country 
management resources has been effective as a basic tool in analyzing the fundamental issue of 
international operations of the firm. However, the existing models, which tend to emphasize 
application of country-specific resources, does not sufficiently explain the frequently 
encountered question of why multinational enterprises (following, MNEs) from the same home 
country pursue different strategic paths and actions when managing overseas operations.   
The present paper attempts to incorporate a dynamic and firm-specific perspective and 
empirically analyze how differences in the financial resources and organizational capabilities of 
MNEs from the same home country affect the strategy and competitive behavior of their 
operations in the same local country. The analysis will center on the two Japanese auto 
assemblers, specifically Toyota Motor Corporation and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, which 
have local production facilities in both Australia and Thailand. These two countries provide 
interesting case studies because in both the local operations experienced a serious crisis in recent 
years. The crisis for local auto producers in Australia began in the 1980s with the removal of 
protectionist policies and the rapid liberalization of the auto market. In Thailand, exceedingly 
severe conditions for local auto assemblers were caused by the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The 
present paper will focus its attention on the differences in the responses by Toyota and 
Mitsubishi to these crises, which we characterize as “larger competent firm” and “smaller 
competent firm” respectively. 
The two firms in question have both maintained international competitiveness in 
production in their common home country of Japan, in addition to building top-level local 
competitiveness in their Australian and Thai operations. However, when faced with a growth 
opportunity and a subsequent crisis, the responses of the local operations of the firms were 
markedly different. It is anticipated that behind these differences in firm conduct lie interfirm 
differences in firm scale (i.e. financial power) and dynamic organizational capabilities (e.g., 
capability-building capability) in their home country. The present paper will attempt to delineate 
these interfirm differences and their effects on firm conduct to explain why two firms from the 
same home country would show such different patterns of conduct even though they face the 




Firm-specific Patterns of Local Operations by Multinational Manufacturers: The purpose of 
the present paper is to analyze how the behavior of MNEs’ overseas operations for adaptation to 
local environmental changes is affected by such firm-specific characteristics as firm sizes and 
organizational capabilities. The focus of our empirical case study is the overseas production 
operations of two Japanese automobile MNEs, Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors, in Thailand and 
Australia. The paper pays particular attention to the differences in firm size and organizational 
capabilities of these MNEs, as well as the impact of these characteristics on patterns of the firm’s 
adaptive behavior to certain crises in their local production operations.     
In international business, much attention has been directed to the international expansion of 
firms based on their use of resources and competitive capabilities that have been built up in their 
home country to create a competitive advantage over host-country firms (Hymer [1976], Vernon 
[1971], Bartlett and Ghoshal [1989]). More recently, the organizational capabilities and 
competitive advantages of Japanese manufacturing firms (in automobiles, electronics, etc.) have 
been analyzed as important factors in the establishment of overseas transplants (cf. Abo et al. 
[1994]). 
The theoretical framework that MNEs apply home-country competitive advantages in 
oversea expansion has been useful as a basic tool in analyzing the fundamental issue of the 
international operations of the firm. However, this model, which emphasizes the application of 
country-specific resources, is often insufficiently capable of explaining the frequently 
encountered question of why firms from the same home country pursue different development 
paths and different strategic choices when managing overseas operations. 
First of all, we need an additional framework to explain the firm-specificity of individual 
MNEs. The existing literature tends to emphasize country-specific behavioral patterns and the 
performance of MNEs in general (e.g., advanced versus developing countries, Japan versus 
Western firms), while de-emphasizing the inter-firm differences of MNEs from the same home 
country. And yet, it is fairly common to observe significant differences in the local operational 
patterns of, for example, the two Japanese multinational automobile manufacturers, considered 
in this paper. Thus, there is a need for us to turn our attention to firm-specific factors, such as firm 
size and organizational capabilities.     
Second, we need to stress the dynamic aspects of the MNEs’ organizational capabilities. 
The commonly employed framework, which seeks to explain the competitive actions of a local 
subsidiary by the application of resources developed in home countries, tends to regard local 
actions as passive responses to local environments and headquarters’ policies. The autonomous 
capability-building processes of the local overseas operations have necessarily received little 
attention. However, it is known that, when confronted with a local crisis, local operations may be 
able to accumulate and improve their organizational capabilities as they deal with the crisis. In 
explaining such a phenomenon, in place of a uni-directional and static framework, what is 
needed is an analysis that examines the dynamic “capability-building capability” of a MNE 
(Fujimoto [1997] [1999]), which may be applied to its local subsidiary to promote the building ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç úç
 
of capabilities in the local operation. 
Third, as has been shown in Fujimoto (1998) and Fujimoto and Sugiyama (2000), the 
capability development paths of foreign operations themselves do not necessarily proceed 
according to a deliberate plan, but rather are frequently processes fraught with unintended 
successes or failures, as well as trials and errors. In other words, the path of local 
capability-building tends to be of an emergent nature. Therefore, what is in need of explanation 
is the “evolutionary capability” (Fujimoto 1997, 1999) of a firm to gain comparative advantage 
over rivals given a capability building process so emergent in nature. In other words, the 
behaviors of MNEs may be explained not only by their deliberate strategies, but also by their 
“emergent global strategies.” 
In summary, this paper emphasizes three additional aspects of the MNE’s behavior in its 
local operations: firm-specificity, dynamics, and emergent process.   
 
Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in Thailand and Australia: Based on the above agenda, the 
present paper will incorporate the above perspective and empirically analyze how differences in 
the resource endowments and dynamic capabilities of firms from the same home country affect 
the strategy and competitive behavior of their operations in the same local country.   
The analysis will center on two Japanese automobile assemblers, specifically Toyota and 
Mitsubishi Motors, which have local production facilities in both Australia and Thailand. These 
two countries provide interesting case studies because in both the automobile sector has 
experienced a severe shock in recent years. The crisis for local auto producers in Australia began 
in the 1980s with the removal of protectionist policies and the rapid liberalization of the auto 
market. In Thailand, exceedingly severe conditions for local auto assemblers were caused by the 
1997 Asian economic crisis. The present paper will focus its attention on the differences in the 
responses by Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors to these crises. 
The two firms in question have both maintained international competitiveness in 
production in their common home country of Japan, in addition to building top-level local 
competitiveness in their Australian and Thai operations. However, when faced with a crisis, the 
responses of the local operations of the firms were markedly different. It is anticipated that 
behind these differences in firm conduct lie interfirm differences in scale, financial strength, 
product strategy, and capability-building capability. The present paper will attempt to clearly 
delineate these interfirm differences and their effects on firm conduct to explain why two firms 
from the same home country show such different patterns of conduct even though they face the 
same regional environment. 
 
2. Framework: Internationalization of “Large” and “Small” MNEs 
 
Firm Size and Organizational Capability: First, let’s illustrate our framework of analysis. 
Generally speaking, there are at least two main factors affecting firm behavior and 
competitiveness in the same industry or market: firm size and organizational capability. The 
former is a factor emphasized by standard economics. Organizational capability, on the other ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç ûç
 
hand, means a system of organizational routines that create firm-specific and difficult-to-imitate 
advantages. A firm’s organizational capability consists of (i) static capability to consistently 
outperform rivals at any given point in time, and (ii) dynamic capability that enables the firm to 
improve its performance and capability faster than rivals (Penrose [1968], Nelson and Winter 
[1982], Teece et al., [1992]). Thus, when we observe different patterns of performance and 
behavior by two MNEs in the same local environments and in responding to changes in these 
environments, we can infer from this fact that they may be different in their firm size, static 
organizational capability regarding higher productivity and quality, or dynamic capability 
regarding improvement of such productive performance and capability.     
 
Emergent Global Strategy: The global strategies of MNEs have recently been discussed 
from the point of view of international linkages of resources and capabilities. Transnational 
strategy (Bartlett and Ghoshal [1989]), for example, emphasizes international and bilateral 
linkages of human, material, financial and technological resources and knowledge between a 
firm’s international operations. International Motor Vehicle Program of MIT (Womack, et al. 
[1990]) also advocated a similar global network.     
The existing works on global strategic management, however, tend to base their 
explanations on the “strategy as plan” concept, i.e. strategy that is driven by a prior grand design 
and deliberate decision making at headquarters. Rational decisions do more or less guide the 
international operations of manufacturing firms, but it is also possible that a global network of 
operations may evolve into something the original intention did not predict.     
In the field of strategic management, the notion of “strategy as plan”, in which strategic 
intent precedes strategic implementation, has been a prevalent idea for many years. (Andrews 
[1980], Hofer and Schendel [1978], etc.) However, there has also been another concept of 
strategy, “strategy as pattern,” which assumes the possibility that competitive strategy may be 
formed even without a competitively rational prior intention. Mintzberg and his colleagues call a 
strategy that was unintended but realized “emergent strategy” (Mintzberg and Waters [1985]). 
Actual strategy formation tends to be an unpredictable mixture of emergent strategies and 
deliberate strategies (Fujimoto [1997] [1999]). A firm’s distinctive dynamic capability to create 
effective organizational routines in this kind of emergent situation may be called “evolutionary 
learning capability.” 
Such an argument on emergent strategy and evolutionary capability may also be applied to 
the case of global strategy. In this paper, we will also pay attention to “emergent global strategy,” 
in which a firm builds the organizational capabilities of its local facilities through ex-post 
responses to local crises.   
 
Analytical Framework: Based on the above discussion, we propose an analytical 
framework that may provide additional insight for understanding difference in the local 
behaviors of MNEs (Figure 8.1). This matrix classifies manufacturing MNEs based on (i) 
relative size of the firm as a whole and (ii) static organizational capabilities in manufacturing 
operations (e.g., productivity, and quality in production and product development). The resulting ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç üç
 
four categories are: competent large firms; competent small firms; incompetent large firms; 
incompetent small firms. Note that what we refer to as “competent” and “incompetent” are not 
the financial and managerial capabilities of the entire MNEs, but their operational capabilities 
that bring about higher productive performance in their factories and development centers. Note 
also that the terms “large,” “small,” “competent” and “incompetent” are conceived of as in 
relative terms. “Competent firm” means that the firm’s operational performance is ranked 
among the best worldwide; “Large firm” means that the firm is listed among the largest 
companies worldwide in the industry. According to this classification, Toyota and Mitsubishi 
Motors may be classified as “large competent firm” and “small competent firm” respectively.   
As for Toyota, it is also known that the company possesses a superior dynamic 
organizational capability, an “evolutionary learning capability” in particular (Fujimoto [1997] 
[1999]). That is, Toyota may be characterized as “a large competent firm that also learns and 
evolves rapidly.” 
 
Stages of Environmental Changes: Let’s turn to the environmental side and identify three 
stages before and after the period of growth and crisis (Table 8.1). Although our foci in this paper 
are Thailand and Australian automobile market during the 1980s and 1990s, a similar pattern 
may be observed in other emerging markets. Thus, the present classification may be broadly 
applicable to various situations in other regions and industries.   
(1) Initial Condition: Small Local Market and Import Substitution Policy: Less-developed 
car-producing countries in the 1960s and 70s were generally characterized by small markets 
(less than 200,000 units per year) and local governmental trade policies aiming at import 
substitution by restricting or banning complete vehicle imports.ç As a result, many of the 
automobile MNEs chose to establish knock down (KD) assembly plants in each fragmented 
local market and produced a small number of many different models each of which was 
designed in the MNE’s home country. Local governments also enforced local content policies 
that facilitated local production of a certain percentage of automobile parts.   
The local facilities for assembly and parts production naturally lacked international 
competitiveness. Their exports were limited to small volumes headed for small neighbor 
markets. In addition, the band-wagon effect among the MNEs resulted in many auto makers 
rushing to build assembly and parts plants in each of the small markets, creating an extremely 
fragmented production structure with several thousands vehicles per model per year being 
produced at most. As a result, the sizes of the local production facilities did not reflect the firm 
size of the MNEs in their home countries -- the local production facilities were all small 
regardless of the MNE’s sites.       
  (2) Production Expansion Stage: The second stage is the production expansion phase. The 
automobile MNEs, which had struggled with the chronic problem of small market size and 
inefficient small volume production in the earlier stage, were able to succeed in expanding local 
production to a certain extent.     
In some cases, production volume expanded mostly due to the expansion of the local 
market itself. In many Asian and Latin American countries, for instance, increases in per capital ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç ýç
 
income and the emergence of a middle class resulted in expansion of both vehicles in use and 
annual sales volume in these local markets. This was particularly the case in South East Asia 
from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. The Australian market, on the other hand, had been 
basically saturated for many years, but it still experienced some expansion thanks to a favorable 
business cycle and the creation of new segments (e.g., the emergence of the sport utility vehicle 
segment).    
In other cases, exports contributed to the growth of local production. This was particularly 
the case when the host country’s government adopted export promotion policies, when the local 
production facilities had certain competitive advantages vis-à-vis neighboring countries, or when 
there were some free trade markets near the country.   
Whether the growth of the local facilities relies on local sales expansion or export growth 
may depend upon the global strategies, financial resources and competitiveness of the MNEs in 
question. As is discussed later, smaller MNEs may have a higher tendency to choose local 
production expansion through greater exports, partly because the number of local facilities 
worldwide is comparatively limited (i.e., one local production facility is more likely to be shared 
by  multiple  markets).   
In any case, responding to the expansion phase, the automobile MNEs sometimes replaced 
their aging KD assembly plants of earlier days with new and expanded plants. Such cases were 
observed in both Thailand and Australia during the 1990s, particularly in the case of large and 
cash-rich firms, such as Toyota.   
 (3) Production Shrinkage Stage: The production expansion stage may be followed by a 
period of “crisis for the local factories,” the third stage, which is characterized by an 
unanticipated and sudden shrinkage of the production volume of the local facilities. Such crises 
could be caused by at least three paths. First, a local economic crisis (e.g., Asian currency crisis 
of 1997) may cause a collapse of local automobile sales. Second, a sudden change of the local 
government policy toward trade liberalization could cause a crisis for the local factories as a 
flood of imports crowd out inefficient local production. The Button plan of the Australian 
government, implemented since the mid-1980s, is a typical example. Developing counties’ 
participation in WTO after 2000 could be another typical case of such policy changes. Third, a 
market collapse or protectionist measures by the main export destinations of the local factories 
could create a crisis for the local plant.   
 
3    Hypotheses: Responses to the Local Crisis by “Large” and “Small” Firms 
 
Assumptions: We will now propose a few hypotheses about the competitive behaviors of 
“large competent firms” and “small competent firms” facing the same local market before a 
local crisis (i.e., the production expansion stage) and after the crisis occurs (i.e., the production 
shrinkage stage).   
Regarding the case analysis later in this paper, Toyota can be regarded as a typical “large 
competent firm,” whereas Mitsubishi Motors is a typical example of a “small competent firm.” 
This is because they are significantly different in firm size, while they are both competitive in ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç þç
 
production and development productivity.   
Let’s also assume that both the “large competent firm” and the “small competent firm” 
make use of their operational advantages in manufacturing and deploy overseas production 
facilities, and that their overseas facilities are located in the same set of host countries as a result 
of the oligopolistic “bandwagon effect” between MNEs. Also, the firms may possess a high 
level of dynamic capabilities (e.g., capability-building capability, evolutionary learning 
capability) in addition to their static manufacturing capability (Fujimoto [1997] [1999]). Based 
on the above assumptions, we may derive at least three hypotheses of inter-firm differences in 
the local behavior of the firms as follows.           
 
1. Hypothesis on Pre-Crisis (Production Expansion) Period: A “large firm” with richer 
financial resources, will tend to set up a larger number of “local-market-oriented” production 
lines and develop a larger number of “locally dedicated models” than a “small firm.” If a large 
firm’s model turns out to be close to a “world model” that can be sold in multiple markets, such a 
model may be produced in more than one factory internationally. 
A “small firm,” on the other hand, needs to cope with a large number of overseas markets 
with a smaller number of production lines and models. Therefore, it tends to be more oriented to 
a “world model” that is shared by multiple markets, as well as “export-oriented” production lines 
aiming at global markets, compared with to “large firm.” This tendency applies to both home 
country and overseas factories. If customers in each local market have very unique needs that 
may be filled only by a country-specific model, or if production control cost for handling 
multiple export models is high, other things being equal, the “small firm “ may suffer from 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the larger firms.   
 
Hypothesis 1: A “large competent firm,” other things being equal, has a greater tendency to 
have “local-market-oriented” production lines and “locally dedicated models,” compared to a 
“small competent firm” with similar operational capabilities.   
 
2. Hypothesis on Short-term Effects in Post-Crisis (Production Shrinkage) Period: Let’s 
now assume that a crisis for a local plant (e.g., surge of imports, collapse of local market) occurs, 
which dramatically decreases shipment volume from the local factory to the local market. In this 
situation, a “small firm,” which has had to rely on export-oriented production lines and product 
models during the expansion period  (Hypothesis 1), is more likely to enjoy unintended 
advantages vis-a-vis a “large firm,” because the former ‘s locally produced models are less 
dependent on the local market which is in crisis. In other words, the “small firm” has been forced 
to build manufacturing capabilities to cope with many overseas markets because of its smaller 
number of products and lines, which turned out to absorb the local shocks better once the crisis 
happens. This phenomenon may be regarded as a “global emergent strategy,” as the small firms 
enjoy “unintended but realized” competitive advantages.     
A “large firm,” by contrast, has to live with product models and production lines dedicated 
to the local market. This was regarded as advantageous during the expansion period because ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç ÿç
 
they fit more flexibly to the local demands, but it turns out to be a disadvantage in the Production 
Shrinkage Stage, because the production line cannot absorb the shock via export expansion. 
Thus, at least temporarily, the “large firm” is more likely to suffer more from the local shock 
(Fujimoto and Sugiyama, [1999]). 
 
 Hypothesis 2: A “large competent firm,” other things being equal, tends more to rely on 
“local-market-oriented” production lines and “locally dedicated models,” compared with a 
“small competent firm.”  As a result, it is affected more seriously by the local crisis of sharp 
demand decrease, compared to “small competent firms”.   
 
3. Hypothesis on Local Capability-Building in Post-Crisis (Production Shrinkage) Period: 
Then, what should firms facing the unexpected local crisis do? The small competent firms, with 
poorer financial resources at the headquarters, will try to minimize additional local investment 
and accelerate export drives, thereby absorbing the shocks more effectively. Since the “small 
firms” tended to rely more heavily on exports in the expansion period (Hypothesis 1 and 2), 
further export expansion is likely to be easier for the smaller firms than for larger firms.     
A “large firm,” on the other hand, is more likely to have a bigger production slump because 
its plants tend to be more dependant on the shrinking domestic demand (Hypothesis 1 and 2), 
due to over-adaptation to the local market. If the company’s dynamic capability is low, then it 
will try to survive by minimizing investments and simply waiting for the recovery of the market. 
In an extreme case, the company may close the local facility.   
If the “large firm” has not only a high static manufacturing capability but also a high level 
of dynamic capability of capability-building, the company may combine such a dynamic 
capability and necessary financial investment for converting its local-market-oriented plants to 
export-oriented ones through rapid capability-building for exports. The local subsidiaries may 
play a leading role in executing such a change in the local manufacturing capability.   
If the “large firm” succeeds in the “export capability-building of its local plants” in many 
countries and enriches its global logistics network among its complementary production facilities, 
that MNEs as a whole may change itself from a “multi-domestic firm” to a “global firm” (Porter 
[1985]). This “globalization,” however, is not necessarily based on a deliberate global strategy, 
but on ex-post trial-and-error in response to the crisis. In this sense it may be regarded as 
“emergent global strategy” (Fujimoto [1999] [2000]).   
 
Hypothesis 3: A “large competent firm” with a high dynamic capability of 
capability-building, facing a local crisis, tends more to build its local plants’ export capability in 
order to minimize the shock of the local demand shrinkage, other things being equal. As a result 
of such an emergent strategy, the firm as a whole becomes closer to a “global firm” with a 
network of complementary production.   
 
Having illustrated our analytical framework and a few hypotheses derived from it, the next 
step is to examine how this framework can explain the actual competitive behaviors of ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç Āç
 
manufacturing MNEs facing expansion and subsequent local crisis. Although this paper is 
exploratory in nature, aiming at hypothesis building rather than rigorous hypothesis testing, a 
preliminary case analysis fits this purpose. 
In the remainder of the paper, based on our problem setting and analytical framework, we 
will investigate the cases of Toyota Motor Corporation (a typical “large competent firm with a 
high dynamic capability”) and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (a typical “small competent 
firm”) and their local operations in Thailand and Australia.  In each of the cases, we will 
examine if the two firms responded to local expansion and subsequent local crisis in a consistent 
manner with our framework and hypotheses. We will pay special attention to the dynamic and 
emergent aspects of their local capability-building. 
 
4    Exploratory Consideration: Comparison between Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors 
 
First of all, as an exploratory effort, we sketch the two Japanese MNEs, which are the 
targets of our study, and describe their situation in Thailand and Australia. As we have already 
considered, the factors needed for the firms to make suitable targets are: manufacture and sales 
of similar products, firms having originated in Japan, and manufacturing being done in the same 
host country. Both Toyota Motor Corporation (following, Toyota) and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation (following, Mitsubishi Motors) meet their conditions both in Thailand and 
Australia. 
Before beginning the case studies, as the premise, we will survey the common points and 
differences between Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors, both in Japan and worldwide. 
 
Common points: The principal common characteristic of Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors is, 
in short, they both operate internationally with their competitive advantages in manufacturing, 
and research and development. 
First, both companies have already established a lean manufacturing system, and they 
maintain remarkable competitive advantage internationally both in productivity and in quality 
(Womack, et al. [1990]). In addition, they also maintain a competitive advantage both in overall 
product development performance and in lead-time of product development (Clark and 
Fujimoto [1991]). 
Second, both companies have operations in almost the same areas, including Thailand and 
Australia. This phenomenon can be considered a result of the “Band Wagon Effect”; rival 
companies invest in the same area at the same time because of opposition action between 
oligopoly companies (Knickerbocker [1973]). 
As a result, both companies faced almost the same environmental changes in the Asian 
automotive market, namely the rapid growth of the Asian automotive market in 1990s 
(especially until 1996) and its sudden shrinkage in late-1990s. On the other hand, in Australia 
where the automotive market has matured, the two companies initially were subject to the same 
import-substitution policy that aimed to protect the local market from international competition. 
And later, they faced the same crisis, i.e. the sudden shrinkage of the market for local assembled ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç ø÷ç
 
automobiles. Moreover, both firm have engaged in KD operations for supplying the local market 
both in Thailand and Australia since 1960s.   
 
Fundamental differences: Never the less, despite the similarities, there are also great 
differences between the two companies in terms of corporate scale and financial resources, both 
in Japan and worldwide.   
Toyota is the leader of the Japanese automobile market, where it manufactures more than 3 
million vehicles per year. Toyota’s assembly and component plants are mainly concentrated 
around Toyota city, Japan. Toyota’s total production capacity is over 3 million vehicles. 
Moreover, Toyota has capital tie-ups with Daihatsu Motors, which is strong in micro cars, and 
Hino Motors, which is strong in large buses and trucks. Toyota has left the manufacture and sales 
of micro cars, large buses and trucks to these manufacturers. Furthermore, Toyota has left the 
R&D and manufacturing of Toyota-branded light trucks and mini-vans to Kanto-Jidosha and 
Toyota-Shatai, two of Toyota’s subsidiaries. Toyota itself focus its resources on the R&D and 
manufacture of passenger cars. So, we should therefore view Toyota’s actual strength in R&D 
and manufacturing as going far beyond what can be found in Toyota proper. 
Turning to Mitsubishi Motors, we see that it is 4
th largest firm in the Japanese automobile 
market, and has a production capacity of about one million vehicles. Its main plants in Japan are 
located in Nagoya and Kurashiki, located about 400 kilometers away from Nagoya. Mitsubishi 
Motors has no subsidiaries to leave its R&D or manufacturing functions, so in order to maintain 
its full lineup of vehicles, it has had to develop and manufacture vehicles ranging in size from 
micro cars to large buses and trucks. So, naturally its resource allocation toward R&D and 
manufacturing has to be somewhat “broad and little”. This restriction has affected firm 
decision-making regarding overseas operations, as we will be mentioned later. 
Throughout the 1990s, Toyota’s sales were roughly 3 times that of Mitsubishi Motors’. 
Moreover, Toyota’s operating income has been more than 10 times that of Mitsubishi Motors’. 
Naturally, these differences also produce differences in available financial resources for product 
development and new models. 
In spite of its limited financial resources, however, Mitsubishi Motors operates widely 
overseas much the same as Toyota. This can be understood to be a result of oligopolistic action. 
In order to operate widely overseas with its limited financial resources, Mitsubishi Motors’ 
foreign subsidiaries have traditionally been joint ventures, with the firm not being too particular 
about possessing a majority. Such firm behavior contrasts remarkably with Toyota, which has 
sought to operate its foreign subsidiary from a majority stake. 
Toyota is noted to have a relatively high dynamic capability, in other words an “emergent 
capability”, meaning the firm is able to evolve its organizational routines ether planned or 
emergently over the long term (Fujimoto [1997], Fujimoto [1999]). World famous Toyota 
Manufacturing System can also be regarded as the result of this emergent capability. There is no 
research that shown that Mitsubishi Motors is inferior in this dimension, but at least, there is 
much historical evidence that indicates Toyota has a remarkable dynamic organizational 
capability (Fujimoto [1997]). ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øøç
 
As we mentioned above, both Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors belong to a stronger group of 
firms vis-à-vis their static competitive capability, productivity and production quality. Also they 
are similar in the geographical pattern of overseas operations. However, there are great 
differences between the firms in terms of in their company size. Moreover, in dynamic capability, 
Toyota may be in higher position. 
 
5ç ç ç ç Case Study (1): Asian Economic Crisis and Toyota/Mitsubishi Motors in Thailand 
(Table 8.2) 
 
In this case study, following the research framework outlined earlier, we consider the 
environmental changes in Thailand and Australia in two stages: Production Expansion Stage and 
Production Shrinkage Stage. (Table 8.1) The former is the stage in which a company is forced to 
increase its local sales as well as local production, because of local market growth or industrial 
policy that targets production growth per model. The latter is the stage in which the market for 
locally-build vehicle decreases for some reason, for example because of an economic crisis, an 
increase in imported-cars, or the cancellation sales of tie-up, etc. 
 
Overview of Automotive industry in Thailand and Time division of the target study period: 
In Thailand, there has never been an industrial policy that excluded foreign control of local 
automobile manufacturers. The industrial policy focused on import-substitution using foreign 
designed vehicles performed by foreign-owned local manufacturers, including localization of 
parts. So, foreign owned manufacturers assembled their vehicle solely for local market, and 
these firms included Japanese auto manufacturers. However, a major environmental change took 
place in the 1990s, and foreign manufacturers, including the two targets of this research, had to 
change their strategy in Thailand and vicinity. We consider these changes by dividing them into 
2 stages. (Table 8.3) 
(1) Production Expansion Stage---From the early 1990s to 1996, because of rapid 
economic growth, automotive sales in Thailand grew rapidly, and manufacturers were obliged to 
increase their production. The automotive market in Thailand was forecast to increase to more 
than one million vehicles a year; so many manufacturers increased their total production 
capacity.  
(2) Production Shrinkage Stage ---After 1997, because of the Baht depreciation in 1997, 
automotive sales in Thailand fell sharply. In 1998, they fell to about 150,000, about one quarter 
of 1996 total. So, it became necessary for manufacturers to start and rapidly increase their 
exports, in order to survive. 
 
Initial Condition: From the 1960s, both Toyota Motor Thailand (following: TMT) and 
Mitsubishi Motors did small scale Knock Down assembly locally, but they were operating only 
import-substitution plants under the Thai Government’s regulations on imported vehicles. 
Mitsubishi Motors’ KD plant merged with its sales company in 1987 (MMC Sittipol Co., Ltd., 
following, MSC). ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øùç
 
 
MSC’s strategy for Production Expansion Stage: In short, MSC’s main strategy in this stage 
was construction of an export-oriented plant for 1-ton pick-up trucks (following: pick-ups). It 
was necessary for Mitsubishi Motors to expand its production capacity, in order to fill the 
increasing demands for pick-ups in Thailand, Oceania, Southern Europe, and so on. However, at 
that time Mitsubishi Motors’ sales in Japan were doing well, with little demands in Japan for 
pick-up. So, Mitsubishi Motors thought that it would be better for its operations in Japan to focus 
on passenger cars and recreational vehicles, rather than to increase pick-up production.   
From such reasons, Mitsubishi Motors decided to construct export-oriented plant for 
pick-ups in the first half of 1990s. Mitsubishi Motors decided to construct the new plant in 
Thailand, because it is the largest market of pick-ups after the U.S., and it was also a reasonable 
site for labor and plant location. In 1996, MSC began operation of its export-oriented plant for 
pick-ups. 
So, the strategic attitude of the “Small Company” was aimed at the effective use of its 
limited managerial resources emergently led to the strategic decision: “construction of the 
export-oriented plant for pick-ups”. (See Orihashi [2000b] for details.) 
 
TMT’s strategy for Production Expansion Stage: In contrast, TMT constructed new plant in 
the suburbs of Bangkok, and transferred main production of its passenger cars: Corolla and Soluna 
(Asian specific vehicle). So, Toyota’s old plant, which is near Bangkok city center, concentrated its 
production on Hilux (pick-ups). (Corona still produced at the old plant, too.) TMT expected the 
demand for passenger cars to increase rapidly together with motorization in Thailand, so the new 
plant was designed mainly for production for domestic Thai market. TMT did not engage in 
large-scale CBU exports and its position in Toyota’s worldwide strategy remained as an 
“import-substituting plant”. 
 
MSC’s strategy in the Production Shrinkage Stage: MSC started first with Australia as the 
destination for its large-scale exports, because Australian vehicles, like those in Thailand, are 
right-hand drive and Australia is also geographically near to Thailand. MSC has since expanded 
the scope of its exports to about 90 countries. The main markets are EU countries, especially 
Spain and Portugal, and Australia. No exports to the United States which is the biggest market 
for pick-ups, has yet been recorded. The reason for this is because there is a high import duty for 
commercial vehicle imported into the U.S., and because pick-ups that are sold in the U.S. are 
about 4000cc while Thai-produced pick-ups are about 2500cc. At present, most of 
Thailand-build pick-ups are exported because of the shrinkage of domestic Thai market. So, 
MSC has had to shut down the old plant that had been manufacturing pick-ups for the local Thai 
market. As MSC started its large-scale export earlier, the company has been able to keep ahead 
of other manufacturers that examined and started large-scale exports after the crisis. 
 
TMT’s strategy in the Production Shrinkage Stage: The Asia Economic Crisis occurred in 
1997, when TMT had already finished construction of its new plant and its operations were well ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øúç
 
under way. Like other local manufacturers, TMT’s capacity utilization rate dropped as local 
demand shrank. 
Faced with this difficult situation, TMT decided to increase its exports, reduce its human 
resources and greatly increase its invested capital. Late in 1998, in accordance with a Hilux 
(pick-up) model change, Australian model production moved from Japan (Hino) to TMT. But 
TMT has had a hard time purchasing local parts that meet Australian Design Rules (ADR), so 
the local content ratio of TMT’s export models still remains low. At the same time, TMT has 
been working hard to increase exports of parts, such as diesel engines of pick-ups sold in Japan 
and the EU. In order to increase its exports, TMT is working hard to raise the local content ratio 
of export models and to strengthen its manufacturing capability. 
 
Summary (Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in Thailand): As we have seen above, in Thai 
Automobile industry, we could observe the pattern that match with our hypothesis in this paper. 
Japanese automotive manufacturers in Thailand faced environmental change, namely a 
rapid increase of local production continuing until the Asian economic crisis. Among these, 
Mitsubishi Motors, the “small competent firm”, expanded its production on the assumption that 
it would export the worldwide model it would produce pick-ups. The possession of this 
capability for worldwide exports gave the firm a “buffer”, so that only a small effect was caused 
by the Asian economic crisis. Mitsubishi Motors, having already built-up manufacturing 
capability for export, with fall of Thai Baht, was able to smoothly expand exports from Thailand. 
We must also take into consideration the fact that MSC already had previously experience doing 
large-scale export. This experience came from when it engaged in relatively large-scale export of 
the Passenger car; Lancer to Chrysler Canada in the first half of the 1990s. MSC managed to 
overcome the crisis by shutting down its KD plant for the domestic market and integrating this 
plant’s production into its export-oriented plant.   
Mitsubishi Motors’ strategy, which was influenced by its lack of resources, ended up fitting 
with the environment after the Asian economic crisis and has been a source of competitive 
advantage. 
On the other hand, Toyota, the “large competent firm with a high dynamic capability”, 
developed a local oriented vehicle (passenger car) and expanded its local production (including 
the construction of a new factory for passenger cars) prior to the crisis. These decisions came to 
put great pressure on the management of TMT, requiring capability reorganization; TMT needed 
to gain the capability for exports. Because Toyota possesses a dynamic organizational capability 
that allows it to cope with unexpected environmental changes like the Asian economic crisis, this 
reorganization has been taking place. 
Though only one case of two firms in one industry in one country, the case study shown 
above in generally consistent with Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 regarding “small competent firm” and 
“large competent firm with a high dynamic capability”. 
 
6 Case Study (2): Crisis due to Production Reduction and Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors 
in Australia (Table 8.4) ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øûç
 
 
In this section, we discuss an environmental change that took place in the Australian 
automobile industry beginning in mid-1980s and the strategic reaction of the Australian 
subsidiaries of Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors: Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (following, 
TMCA) and Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd. (following, MMAL) respectively. (See Orihashi 
[1998] for additional detail.) The drastic change in industrial policy was the cause of the 
environmental change. As an initial step, the history of TMCA and MMAL up to the mid-1980s 
is outlined.   
 
Overview: TMCA and MMAL to the mid-1980s: In early 1960s, Toyota engaged in CKD 
export contract with Australian Motor Industries (AMI) and started to sell passenger cars to 
Australia. After the late-1960s, Toyota started to commit deeply to Australia, taking and then 
gradually increasing its equity stake in its Australian operations. In 1976, Toyota participated in 
the 85% localization plan for passenger vehicles in Australia. In order to meet the 85%, Toyota 
worked hard to localize its main components. In 1977, Toyota constructed facility for engine and 
press in Altona, a suburb of Melbourne. (TMA) 
On the other hand, MMAL was formerly Chrysler Australia (CAL). In 1971, Mitsubishi 
Motors and Chrysler made a contract covering distribution, trademark and technical assistance in 
Australia, following the capital tie-up between both companies. Mitsubishi Motors started to 
build Mitsubishi vehicles in Australia. The share of Mitsubishi vehicles gradually increased as a 
portion of the total production of CAL; Chrysler also came into financial difficulty, and 
Mitsubishi Motors was asked to commit directly. So, Mitsubishi Motors, together with 
Mitsubishi Corporation, purchased almost all of the shares of CAL, and CAL became MMAL. 
MMAL started to manufacture the Magna, a model that was an Australia-exclusive modified 
version of Diamante, and it became a sales hit. Moreover, MMAL developed a derivative 
product, the Magna-based station wagon, by itself. 
 
Time division of the study target stages: The environmental changes that took place in the 
Australian automotive industry after 1984 are considered in 2 stages, based on changes in 
Australia’s industrial policies. (Table 8.5) 
(1) Production Expansion Stage (1984-1992): Prior to 1984, protected by a protectionist 
industrial policy, local automobile manufacturers in Australia supplied high-cost passenger cars 
for domestic market.   
However, a new industrial policy for automotive industry the “Button Car Plan” was 
announced in 1984. It aimed at a rationalizing of the model lineups and production systems of 
local manufacturers by encouraging competition. The ultimate goal of this policy was the 
improvement of the quality and productivity of local manufacturers and a reduction in car prices. 
In more detail, the government aimed to increase per-model production through reorganization 
of local manufacturers having each manufacturer expand its production scale and reduce the 
numbers of its model. Also the government opened local market slightly in order to encourage 
competition. By these policies, the government sought a way to help local manufacturers aimed ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øüç
 
local manufacturers to survive in worldwide competition.   
Local manufacturers (Ford Australia, GM Holden, TMCA, MMAL and Nissan Australia) 
had to cope with this new policy. The policy included a penalty for small-scale production of 
models, so the local firms struggled to form joint ventures and other form of inter-firm tie-ups, 
including OEM supply of each other (small and medium cars from Japanese firms, and large 
cars from American firms). As is mentioned later, TMCA and GM Holden (following, GMHA) 
formed a joint venture. At the same time, Ford Australia entered into a tie-up with Nissan 
Australia.  
(2) Production Shrinkage Stage (1992- ): After the “Button Car Plan,” industrial policy 
towards the automotive industry changed first in 1988 and again in 1992. The stress of the policy 
gradually moved from strengthening the local industry to market liberalization. As a result, 
disadvantages began to exceed advantages gained by JVs and tie-ups, as the strategic freedom of 
each company was reduced. Thus, the agreements were gradually cancelled. Inter-firm tie-ups 
turned out to be a temporary measure against the “Button Car Plan”. In 1991, Ford Australia and 
Nissan Australia ended their tie-up and Nissan withdrew from producing in Australia the next 
year though its casting plant and sales function remain. 
 
MMAL’s strategy for Production Expansion Stage: Initially, MMAL considered a tie-up 
with another local manufacturer, but could not find a partner that met its conditions. So, it 
became necessary for the firm to survive on its own.   
MMAL stopped production of small car and concentrate its production on medium cars, a 
model which is exclusively sold in Australia. Because Australia was the biggest market of 
Diamante-based cars, Mitsubishi Motors concentrate their production to MMAL, excluding 
sedans sold in Japan, in order to maintain MMAL’s production volume.   
However MMAL did not do large investment for exportation, other than in its casting plant 
that sharply increased exports to Japan. MMAL managed to export by building its production 
level capability with the existing facility. Doing so caused disadvantages in quality and 
productivity, compared to building a new facility, but should exports not go well in the future, 
MMAL won’t suffer in terms of its financial resources, in other words this strategic decision kept 
flexibility high. 
 
TMCA’s strategy for Production Expansion Stage: On the other hand, Toyota considered 
overseas relationship with GM in the US more than it considered the local condition. TMCA 
(mainly Australian managers) examined a deal with MMAL, but Toyota finally decided on a 
joint venture with GMHA, which had initially came out GM’s request. Behind this JV, there lies 
the worldwide factor that Toyota had just entered into a joint venture in the U.S. with GM; New 
United Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI), as a the measure to avoid automobile trade 
conflict between Japan and the U.S.. In Australia, Toyota and GM established a holding 
company, United Australian Automotive Industries Ltd. (UAAI), with an equal investment of 
each. Both TMCA and GMHA became 100%-owned subsidiaries of UAAI. Both companies 
continued to operate individually, except that the provided vehicles to each other on an OEM ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øýç
 
basis. However, any large-scale investments needed to get the partner company’s approval.   
TMCA supplied small and medium cars; the Corolla and Camry, to GMHA, and local 
demand eventually grew to exceed the capacity of the existing Port Melbourne plant. So, TMCA 
borrowed capacity from Dandenong plant, former GMHA plant, and transferred production of 
the Corolla there. However, because both plants were already rather worn-down (especially their 
painting facilities), TMCA decided to construct a new plant in Altona, where a press, engine, and 
transmission facilities had already been completed, as was mentioned above. TMCA 
concentrated almost all its production into its new plant and quality and productivity was 
dramatically improved. At the same time, TMCA pushed forward with a supplier-strengthening 
program (initiated in the early 1990s, with the Australian Government’s support) and moved 
towards the making progress in the building of its production capability. As a result, the firm 
could gain competitive advantage over other local manufacturers. (See Fujimoto [1998] and 
Fujimoto [2000] for detail.) 
 
MMAL’s strategy for Production Shrinkage Stage: MMAL did not enter into any tie-ups 
with other local manufacturer in the Production Expansion Stage and little effect was caused by 
this decision. As MMAL had already decided, it continued its effort to expand exports and 
began started large-scale export from 1992. Most exported vehicles were sent to the United 
States. It also exported the Diamante Wagon to Japan. 
Why could not MMAL start large-scale exports earlier? In fact, product quality obstructed 
this option. MMAL encountered various difficulties overseas, especially that for the United 
States, where Product Liability Act had been passed. Through MMAL’s exhaustive activities to 
improve quality, the firm’s manufacturing capability also improved. 
However, MMAL did not financially invest largely in its facility. This strategic choice 
affects its production system. For example, the Magna’s side panel was pressed only after it was 
divided into 2 parts, because of the small size of MMAL’s press machine. The two parts then put 
together by welding. At most manufacturers, the side panel is pressed as one part. 
 
TMCA’s strategy for Production Shrinkage Stage: As has already been mentioned, TMCA 
had worked hard to improve its manufacturing capability. Table 8.6 shows that, given its 
production size, in 1996, TMCA was already by no means inferior in its cost to manufacturing 
facilities in Japan and the United States, where the Camry is manufactured. 
TMCA ended the JV with GMHA in 1996, because of a decrease in demand for OEM 
vehicle and further liberalization of the Australian market. As OEM vehicles for GMHA came 
to be no longer needed, TMCA had to export in order to maintain its production volume. 
Because TMCA had already improved its manufacturing capability, Toyota announced its plan 
to start large-scale export from TMCA to the Persian gulf countries in 1996. In August 1997, 
TMCA completed a full model change of the Camry, and started large-scale exports to gulf 
countries. However, numerous problems with the quality of these exported vehicles occurred 
then. (Orihashi [2000a]) 
The first problem was with TMCA employees’ understanding of the meaning of quality. ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øþç
 
TMCA employees had the sense that all they had to do was to achieve Toyota’s worldwide 
quality standard. On the other hand, in Japan, employees produced automotive that exceed that 
standard in accordance with soi-kuhu activities. Toyota dealers in gulf countries thought the 
difference between “made in Australia” and “made in Japan” was a problem in accordance with 
the condition mentioned above. The second problem was with a lack of skill on the assembly 
line. The third problem was the understanding of quality of consumers in gulf countries is stricter 
than that of Australian consumers. Due to the first and second problems, “made in Australia” did 
not fill the quality standard of the export market. The fourth problem was the inferior image for 
“made in Australia” vehicles. The fifth problem was development process. The Camry was a 
vehicle developed for worldwide, so its development was a joint project of Japan, the United 
States and Australia. Naturally the condition of TMCA’s facility was not considered sufficient at 
the time of development and the model’s minor change, because TMCA is relatively small in 
terms of scale. In fact, Japan and the U.S. played the main role in the product’s development. 
TMCA worked hard to overcome the problems above as follows. At first, TMCA formed a 
repairing team and sent them to the gulf countries. Before that, if an imported vehicle 
manufactured by a foreign subsidiary of Toyota happened to be defective, the local dealer would 
repair it and claim the cost of repairs to the subsidiary. Moreover, inspection personnel of local 
dealers in the gulf countries went to Australia at TMCA’s expense, and started inspections of 
vehicles before they were shipped. This project continued until the quality reached a sufficient 
level. At the same time, TMCA raised the awareness of its employees’ sense of quality to regard 
the local dealers’ request as the standard to be reached. Of course, building mutual trust between 
TMCA and the local dealer was the key solution. As for the development process, Toyota now 
promotes technical communication between the three countries more than in the past. 
The problem outlined above caused a change in Toyota’s attitude toward international 
business. Prior to this experience that it was wasteful for each foreign subsidiary to have the 
function of export market relations. As a result, headquarters in Japan performed this function. 
However, after this problem, as an individual company, TMCA has sent an Australian manager 
to Middle East for ongoing communication with local dealers, in order to prevent new problems 
from surfacing. Also, in the Thailand case, TMT sent a Thai manager to TMSA (Toyota’s Sales 
company in Australia), in order to cope with the possibility of quality problems with the 
Thai-made Hilux. 
By these efforts, TMCA achieved the capability to maintain the necessary high quality 
standard, one that is superior to other manufacturers in Australia. TMCA exported more than 
30,000 vehicles in 1998. From this it can be inferred that TMCA has achieved in a short period 
the capability needed to export, by engaging in the activities we mentioned above. 
 
Summary (Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in Australia): As is outlined above, in the 
Australian Automobile industry, patterns of firm behavior that match the framework and 
hypotheses of this paper can be found, though not as clear as that in Thai Automobile industry. 
Facing a local crisis, that forced an increase in production per model and followed by a 
change to liberalization as regulated by the Australian Government, Toyota, a “large competent ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øÿç
 
firm with a high dynamic capability”, viewing its relationship with GM more important than the 
domestic circumstances, formed a joint venture with GMHA. This strategy itself was not simple 
correspondence, but as a result, TMCA came to provide small and medium car to GMHA and 
have local demand that exceeded the capacity of its existing plant. So, TMCA borrowed former 
GMHA plant at first, and then constructed in Altona a new assembly plant. As a result, TMCA 
expand its local-oriented production, though not intended at first. Needless to say, in the 
background of this, there lies Toyota’s financial resources that were maintained despite 
economic sluggishness in Japan. 
However, due to the rapid increase of imported cars and cancellation of the joint venture 
with GMHA, TMCA had to change its strategy toward the expansion of exports in order to 
maintain its operations. This was a great challenge for TMCA, but thanks to the dynamic 
organizational capability against unexpected environmental changes that is possessed by Toyota, 
TMCA could manage to start large-scale exports to the Middle East in a relatively short period 
of time.   
We cannot conclude whether or not TMCA will be able to survive in the long run, but at 
least, it is a fact that the international competence of TMCA has made rapid progress through the 
sequences of its efforts for export expansion. 
On the other hand, Mitsubishi Motors, a “small competent firm”, selected a strategy that 
maintained its local production through the expansion of exports. A tie-up with other local 
manufacturer was not realized, so MMAL attempted to survive alone. MMAL concluded that it 
could not maintain 2 models, because it was only the 4
th or 5
th largest manufacturer in Australia. 
So, MMAL concentrated its production on one model (Magna), and began the large-scale export 
of it, in the pursuit of further scale merits. Because the largest market of the model was Australia, 
Mitsubishi Motors transferred most of its production from Japan to MMAL. Aided by this 
decision, MMAL completed its transfer into an “export-oriented plant”. 
As compared with TMCA, MMAL started its efforts to become an “export-oriented plant” 
earlier, and MMAL managed to maintain its operation without a large investment in its 
production facility. The firm’s measures in response to the increase of import car were relatively 
softer in comparison with TMCA. 
As has been discussed, the strategic reactions of the Japanese automotive manufacturers in 
Australia toward the change of industrial policy were emergent in nature. This phenomenon 
became a little confusing with the tie-ups between MNEs, however it is basically consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3; and the large company at first expands its local-oriented production and 
changes its attitude towards export-oriented after the crisis; and the small company was 
export-oriented from the beginning and continue to expand its exports after the crisis. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, to address the question of why the foreign manufacturing subsidiaries of 
MNEs from the same home-country sometimes pursue different strategies in the same host 
country, we have proposed a conceptual framework that takes into consideration the differences ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç øĀç
 
in scale and organizational capability of each MNE. Then, as an example that shows the 
remarkable differences in organizational action that can be observed in the subsidiaries of MNEs 
from the same home-country, we examined the strategy of two Japan-originated automotive 
MNEs in Thailand and Australia, especially measuring the firms’ resilience against a crisis in the 
local subsidiary, the crisis being caused by such external shocks as a regional economic crisis or 
a rapid increase in imported cars, etc. Through this paper’s research, we examined whether our 
conceptual framework is consistent with these cases.   
Needless to say, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from the case studies of only one 
industry in two countries. However, it is possible for us to say that we could obtain practical 
results that are consistent with the conceptual framework and the hypothesis we propose; 
differences in scale (financial resources) in the home country, manufacturing organizational 
capability and dynamic organizational capability affect the selection of the type of local 
manufacturing subsidiary, local product and the marketing of the local product as well as the 
measure of a firm response following a crisis. Furthermore, these relationships were found to 
hold both in the Production Expansion Stage and the Production Shrinkage Stage. It is the main 
conclusion of this research that the conceptual framework we propose contributes to the body of 
research on MNEs by shedding additional light on the strategic behavior of MNEs in the 1990s 
when the global economy started to change rapidly. While respecting the existing conceptual 
framework of the theory of MNE and international business, we insist that the individuality of 
each MNE, for example differences in scale and organizational capability, must be considered 
more seriously when analyze MNEs. 
This paper is an exploratory study based on only a few cases, so there still remain numerous 
questions to address. We must study the possibility of generalizing this conceptual framework 
and hypothesis by expanding the research scope. Can strategic differences of MNEs based on 
scale and organizational capability be observed in Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in countries 
other than Thailand and Australia? Can the framework be applied to other automotive MNE? 
Moreover, can consistent findings be obtained in industries other than automobile industry? Will 
we be need to develop our study in the future to include hypothesis testing by introducing 
statistic analysis? Of course, we must also continue to examine critically the conceptual 
framework itself, whether scale, static capability and dynamic capability, as this study showed, 
are enough to explain the differences in the strategic behavior of firms. 
While many questions, such as those outlined above, remain, we believe the concepts 
introduced here of “uniqueness of each firm”, “dynamics” and “emergence” enrich the analysis 
of manufacturing MNEs, and may be appropriate to some extent. Our conceptual framework 
has also made a contribution to the literature in explaining some important cases of the strategic 
behaviors of Japanese MNEs in the automobile industry that were most active in overseas direct 




The field research by Professor Takahiro Fujimoto took place at Toyota Australia in 1995. 
The field research by Shinya Orihashi took place at Mitsubishi Australia and Toyota Australia in ÷ùõøõùùվగç ç ù÷ç
 
October 1997 and at Toyota Thailand and MMC Sittipol (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors) in 
June 1999. Orihashi visited MMC Sittipol again in November 2000. The two authors have also 
visited the Japanese headquarters of both companies. They are grateful for the corporation of 
Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in this research. The authors would also like to acknowledge the 
cooperation and suggestions provided by Professor Yveline Lecler of Lyon University and Mr. 
Daniel Heller, a graduate student at the University of Tokyo. 
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Table  8.1  Analytical  Framework  (Environmental  Side) 
 
    INITIALLY  PRODUCTION EXPANSION STAGE  PRODUCTION SHRINKAGE STAGE 
CONDITIONS 
 
・Local market is limited. 
・Importing is very difficult, due to 
government policy. 
・Stronger local market or government’s policy stimulate 
firms to increase production volume. 
 
Local market gets weaker. 






・Local sales network is relatively 
weak. 
・Import-substituting plant 
・Not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・Local sales are still not sufficient for competitive 
volume, so they concentrate worldwide production of a 
specific model to the plant. 
…The mission of the plant changes, but new investment 
is limited, due to firm’s financial constraints. 
・Must begin exporting at a. large-scale to various 
countries. 
→Capability-building start. 
Already started to export to various countries 
→Already achieved the capability to compete in 







・Local sales network is strong. 
・Import-substituting plant 
・Not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・Increased local sales force the constructing of a new 
local-oriented plant. 
・Still not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・Now they have to begin exporting at a. large-scale to 
maintain their operation. 
→Capability-building start. 
・The main mission of the plant is still local-oriented. 
→The scope of exports is limited. 





Table 8.2 Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in Thailand 
ç MMC Sittipol  Toyota Thailand 
Started production in 
Thailand 1966  1964 
Capital (Million Bahts)  834  4,520 
Shareholders (Japanese) 
(Thai) 
Mitsubishi Motors 46.23% 
MHTC52.04%, Lee Group1.73% 
Toyota 69.60% 
TABT15.5%, Siam Cement10%, 
etc. 
Employees (2000)  2,945  4,041 
Japanese Nationals 
(2000) 36  35 
Thai Directors(1999)  6  4 
Sales (1999, Million 
Bahts) 39,038  46,445 
Annual Production 
Capacity 136,000  240,000 
Pick-up exports to  90 countries other than North America 
(Mainly South Europe and Australia, 




Models  ç   ç  
Passenger Car (Sedan)  Lancer  Camry, Corolla, Soluna 
Commercial Car  Strada (pick-up), Canter 
(medium-size truck), Fighter (king-size 
truck) 
Hilux 4/2 (pick-up), Dyna 
(truck) 
Source: JAMA, Firm Interviews in June 1999 and November 2000 
  
 
Table 8.3 Analytical Framework (Environmental Side) ---Thailand 
 
   
INITIALLY 
 
  PRODUCTION EXPANSION STAGE   
(Early 1990-1996) 




・Local market is limited. 
・Importing is very difficult, due to 
government policy. 
・Stronger local market force them to increase their 
production volume. 
 
Local market gets weaker. 






・Local sales power is relatively 
weak. 
・Import-substituting plant 
・Not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・A new plant is built in addition to the existing plant, 
and a concentration of worldwide production of 1-ton 
pick-up trucks. 
…The mission of the plant changes. But investment is 
limited by outsourcing plant operations to suppliers. 
・Starting to export at a. large-scale to various countries. 
→Capability-building starts. 
・Already started large-scale export to various 
countries. 
→Already achieved the capability to face many 
types of markets worldwide. 







・Local sales power is strong. 
・Import-substituting plant 
・Not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・Increased local sales stimulate the construction of a 
new local-oriented plant. 
・Start to build an ASEAN specific model (Asian Car) in 
Thailand. 
・Still not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
・Now have to begin large-scale export to maintain 
operation. 
→Capability-building starts. 
・ The main mission of the plants are still 
local-oriented. 
→The scope of their export is limited to Oceania. 




Table 8.4 Toyota and Mitsubishi Motors in Australia 






Mitsubishi Motors (Japan) 60% 
Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan) 40% 
Toyota Japan 100% 
 
Sales (Million 
A$)  2075（estimate 1997）  3900(1996) 





CBU to U.S.A., Japan, New Zealand, 
etc. 
Casting product to Japan 
 
CBU and KD to Persian Gulf countries, 
New Zealand, etc. 
Some auto parts to ASEAN, South 
Africa, etc. 
Characteristics 
of the plant 
Important overseas location for sales 
and production, much the same as the 
U.S., Thailand, and the Netherlands 
Medium size oversea location for 
production in Toyota’s global Network 
Models  Changed from two models to one 
model (Magna) 
Camry and Corolla 
Local Content 
Ratio 
Approx. 75%  65% to 70%ç
Investments 
after1984 
Investments for Model Change and 
Rationalization 
Construction of new plant, Factory 
reorganization 
Employees  5,400(Japanese nationals 18)  4,220(Japanese nationals 20) 
President Australian  Japanese 
Source: firm interview in October 1997  
 
Table 8.5 Analytical Framework (Environmental Side) ---Australia 
 
    INITIALLY  PRODUCTION EXPANSION STAGE (1984-1995)  PRODUCTION SHRINKAGE STAGE (1996-) 
CONDITIONS 
 
・Local market is limited. 
・Importing is very difficult, due 
to government policy. 
・Government’s new policy (Button Car Plan) forces local 
suppliers to increase production volume. 
←Minimum production volume (per model) regulation. 
Local market gets weaker. 
←Due to an increase of imported cars, because of the 





・Local sales power is relatively 
weak. 
・Import-substituting plant 
・Not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・Local sales is still not enough to reach the minimum 
volume, so worldwide production of Magna (Diamante) 
is concentrated to the plant. (Except sedans sold in Japan) 
…The mission of the plant changes. But their investment 
is limited. = Not building a new plant. 
・Starting to export at a. large-scale to various countries. 
→Capability-building starts. 
・Have already started to export to various countries 
→Have already achieved the capability to face many 







・Local sales power is strong. 
・Import-substituting plant 
・Not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
 
・Increased local sales (including OEM for GM Holden) 
force it to construct a new local-oriented plant. 
→Make remarkable progress especially in productivity 
improvement. 
・Still not exporting at a. large-scale. 
 
・Tie-up with GM Holden ends 
→Have to begin exports to maintain the operation. 
→Capability-building starts. 
・ The main mission of the plants are still 
local-oriented. 
→The scope of export is limited. 




Table 8.6ç Australian, United States and Japanese Parts Costs for Toyota Camry (Japan=100) 
Commodities Australia  United  States  Japan 
Coil spring  116  86    100 
Outer mirror  112  94    100 
Seat belts  109  73    100 
Lamps 105  80    100 
Tires 105  91    100 
Glass 101  89    100 
Average of all commodities  106  96    100 
Source: Industrial Commission, The Automotive Industry, 1997, pp.58 